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Canadian Judicial Opinions Regarding the Sikh Religious Identity

Grant v. Canada (Attorney General)

Between
John R. Grant, Kenneth E. Riley, Howard S. Davis, who together
form an unincorporated association known as the "Lethbridge
R.C.M.P. Veterans' Court Challenge Committee", each on their
own behalf and on behalf of the unincorporated association and
Kirsten M. Mansbridge, appellants (plaintiffs), and
The Attorney General of Canada, the Solicitor General of Canada
and Norman D. Inkster, Commissioner of the Royal Canadian
Mounted Police, respondents (defendants)

[1995] F.C.J. No. 830
DRS 95-14222
Appeal No. A-368-94

Federal Court of Appeal
Calgary, Alberta
Isaac C.J., Hugessen and Linden JJ.

Heard: May 31, 1995
Oral judgment: May 31, 1995
(5 pp.)

Civil rights — Discrimination — Religion — Labour standards — Police uniforms — Entitlement to wear turbans.

This was an appeal from decisions holding that there was no violation of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms when section 64 of the RCMP Regulations and the Uniform and Dress Manual were amended to allow members of the RCMP of the Sikh religion to wear their turbans and other religious articles as part of their uniforms. The appellants who were not Sikhs contended that the amendment violated their rights under sections 2(a), 7, and 15 of the Charter.

HELD: Appeal dismissed. The amendments did not violate any sections in the Charter. There was no violation of section 2(a) because the program was not one which restricted religious freedom; it was aimed at enlarging it. There was no violation of section 7 because the appellants were not deprived of life, liberty or security of the person because of the program. Finally, there has been no discrimination contrary to section 15 because other religious groups were in no way prejudiced by this policy.

Statutes, Regulations and Rules Cited:

Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 1982, ss. 2(a), 7, 15. R.C.M.P. Regulations (S.O.R. 90 - 182).

J.J. Mark Edwards, for the appellants.
Terrence Joyce Q.C. and Linda Wall, for the respondents.
Brian A.F. Edy, for the Alberta Civil Liberties Association.
Palbinder K. Shergill, for the intervenor.

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The judgment of the Court was delivered orally by

1 LINDEN J.:— This is an appeal from the decisions of Madame Justice Reed, who held that there was no violation of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms when section 64 of the R.C.M.P. Regulations (S.O.R. 90 - 182) and The Uniform and Dress Manual were amended to allow members of the R.C.M.P. who adhered to the Khalsa Sikh religion to wear their turbans and other religious articles as part of their uniforms. We did not call upon counsel for the respondent nor for the intervenors as we are satisfied that the learned Trial Judge arrived at the correct decision and that her 52 page Reasons for Decision written after an eight day hearing are substantially in accord with the jurisprudence.

2 The appellants challenge the constitutional validity of the incorporation of religious symbols in the significant (or dress) uniform of the R.C.M.P. Despite the imaginative and skilful arguments of Mr. Edwards for the appellants, based on three different sections of the Charter: 2a), 7 and 15, we have come to the conclusion that there is no merit in any of them.

3 We agree with the Trial Judge that there was no violation of freedom of religion pursuant to section 2a). Recognizing that symbols do communicate, the Trial Judge decided that she could not see any compulsion or coercion on members of the public to participate in, adopt or share the religious practices or beliefs of the two officers who took advantage of the new policy. (See p. 2416 A.B.). While infringements of section 2a) may not be limited to cases of coercion, we have not been persuaded that any other type of constitutional infringement has been established in this case. Similarly, concerning the equality aspect of freedom of religion, we have not been convinced that protection of the religious freedom of one group means that there is non-protection for any other group.

4 This program was not one which restricted religious freedom; it was aimed at enlarging it. The appellants argue that their religious freedom is infringed by their being obliged to accept coercive state power exercised by police officers wearing an otherwise inoffensive religious symbol as part of their uniform, but this argument lacks balance for it overlooks the religious freedom of the officers that is being respected by the accommodation arrived at in the adoption of the turban policy.

5 We are also in accord with the Trial Judge who found no infringement of section 7 because, apart from mere "speculation", there was no evidence of any state intrusion; there was no evidence that anyone has been deprived of life, liberty or security of the person. Furthermore we are not persuaded that the incorporation of the turban by itself created a reasonable apprehension of bias. Whether or not there is a convention of neutrality in policing, concrete evidence of deprivation or a reasonable expectation thereof is required before one can succeed under Section 7. One must be careful, to use the words of Justice LaForest in R. v. Beare, ([1988] 2 S.C.R. 387, at p. 401) not to "overshoot" the purpose of Section 7 by applying it to cases where no deprivation or risk of it has been proven. If the Appellants' argument were fully accepted, it might lead to the absurd situation that a Christian police officer could interact only with other Christians, a woman police officer could interact only with other women, a black police officer only with other blacks, a Native Canadian only with other Native Canadians, and, presumably, a white only with other whites. This could not be tolerated in this country.

6 Lastly, we are persuaded that the Trial Judge was right in concluding that there has been no discrimination contrary to section 15. Other religious groups are in no way prejudiced by this policy allowing Sikhs an exemption. The R.C.M.P. indicated that it would consider requests from any other groups on the same basis as the one by the Sikh community and the regulation permits such consideration. Without concrete evidence of actual discrimination against a particular group, such as denying them treatment similar to the Sikhs, no constitutional violation occurs. Rather than being a policy that causes discrimination, our view is that this measure seeks to prevent it. We can see no promotion of the Sikh religion at the expense of the many other religions represented in Canada.

7 The R.C.M.P. is a great Canadian institution with a proud and respected tradition. By adjusting the uniform to take into account the concerns of the Sikh community, the Commissioner was not seeking to weaken that institution but to strengthen it. The expressed purpose of the change was to facilitate recruitment of minorities, to enable the Sikh community to exercise its religious freedom and to reflect the newer multicultural nature of Canada. The Commissioner obviously felt that with proper selection, training, supervision and discipline, individuals of all religious persuasions could serve in the R.C.M.P. impartially and that the force would be made stronger by this program.

8 The Trial Judge found that the appellants, in opposing the changes to the uniform, were "motivated by great pride in the traditions of the R.C.M.P." and were not generally opposed to the wearing of turbans. The Commissioner and the government which amended the regulations disagreed with the appellants' traditional vision of the R.C.M.P., believing rather that the R.C.M.P.'s reputation and effectiveness would be enhanced by the change in policy. We can see nothing in the Charter or its jurisprudence to render this program unconstitutional.

9 The appeal will be dismissed without costs.

LINDEN J.

JUDGMENT
The appeal is dismissed without costs.

QL Update: 950608
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