PREVENTING ATTACKS ON GURDWARAS

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MEMORANDUM

To: U.S. Gurdwara Committees
From: The Sikh Coalition
Date: April 25, 2017
Subject: Preventing Attacks on Gurdwaras

Waheguru Ji Ka Khalsa, Waheguru Ji Ki Fateh!

As a service to the Sikh sangat, and in response to concerns about increasing hate crime risk against Sikhs in the United States, the Sikh Coalition is making Gurdwara security awareness a top priority in 2017. Federal and state government agencies have developed many free resources and trainings to help places of worship, including Gurdwaras, minimize the risk of attacks.

If you would like the Sikh Coalition to facilitate a free Gurdwara Security Training for your local sangat – or if you would like us to organize free trainings on other issues – such as immigration, promoting Sikh awareness, or empowering our children to defend themselves against school bullying – please call us at (212) 655-3095 or send an email to contact@sikhcoaltion.org.

For your convenience, we have enclosed the following informational resources:

- *Protecting Houses of Worship Against Arson – Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)*
- *How to Respond When An Active Shooter is In Your Vicinity – Dept. of Homeland Security (DHS)*

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) also offers free security consulting through its Protective Service Advisor Program. Consultants can visit your Gurdwara and provide advice for improving security, such as installing alarm systems and video cameras, improving locks and lighting, and creating an emergency response plan. Some Gurdwaras may also be eligible for federal grants to improve their physical security. Before contacting DHS about this program, please note that this agency is responsible for immigration enforcement. Although government officials have assured us that their security consultants do not collect or share information that could lead to immigration raids and deportation orders, we cannot know for certain whether this is true. We encourage you to keep this in mind when considering whether this program is right for your sangat.

During the last few months, dozens of Jewish synagogues and Muslim mosques have been subjected to threats, vandalism, and even arson attacks. Anti-immigrant feelings are being promoted by American politicians. Many Americans still cannot distinguish between Sikhs and terrorists affiliated with ISIS or Al Qaeda. In this climate, our community needs to protect its Gurdwaras from attack and avoid a repeat of the deadly attack on the Oak Creek Gurdwara in 2012 that took the lives of six Sikhs in Wisconsin and permanently injured several more. From the times of our Gurus to the present, Sikhs have a long tradition of defending our Gurdwaras against attack, and we look forward to working with you to continue this important tradition.
Clean House

Oftentimes, arson is a crime of opportunity. Remove excess vegetation and piles of leaves. Clean around your religious building and outbuildings, removing unused and unneeded paper, trash, cleaning supplies, partial cans of paint, and other materials that could become kindling and fuel a fire for an arsonist.

Establish a Community Arson Watch Program

Follow the successful Neighborhood Watch five-step program model provided here.

- Step 1: Analyze the specific, local problem and collect related data.
- Step 2: Build a partnership between fire and emergency services, the police and other law enforcement agencies, and the residents.
- Step 3: Assess the needs of your house of worship and determine which problems to focus on and the methods used to address them.
- Step 4: Train a dynamic group of volunteers, led by organized and motivated leaders.
- Step 5: Develop meaningful projects specific to the identified problem.

www.usfa.fema.gov
Illuminate Exterior and Entrances

- Install lights, covering all sides of the building. Motion-activated lighting, which is inexpensive, should be placed near the entrances. Interior lights on timers give the illusion that a house of worship is occupied.

Clear Obstructions

- Trim or remove shrubbery that blocks the view of the building from the street. During the growing season, bushes and trees may need to be trimmed frequently.

Install Smoke Alarms and a Fire Sprinkler System

- The combination of working smoke alarms and home fire sprinklers reduces the likelihood of death from fire by more than 82 percent. The most effective fire loss prevention and reduction measure for both life and property is the installation and maintenance of fire sprinklers.

Keep Doors and Windows Locked

- All external doors should be equipped with dead bolts. A simple locked door could be the deterrent that saves your congregation from experiencing arson. The hardware used to lock windows can sometimes be easily forced open using a credit card or other tool. The best type of window hardware has spring-loaded bolts that insert through the window frame into the wall frame. Limit and track which members of the congregation have keys and alarm codes. Set up a schedule to routinely change the locks.

According to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives’ U.S. Bomb Data Center’s Bomb Arson Tracking System (BATS), there have been an average of 103 arson fires per year at houses of worship reported by federal, state and local agencies, during the 16-year period from 2000 to 2015. BATS shows the most house of worship fires in 2003 with 140 reported and the fewest in 2011 with 72 arson fires. Less than 2 percent (1.86 percent) were initially investigated as a hate crime.

In the U.S., between 1996 and 2015, 51 percent of the reported incidents at houses of worship were determined to be caused by arson, according to a recent analysis by the Pew Research Center.

Arson robs congregations of valuable assets, lives and property. Arson destroys more than the buildings used as houses of worship; it can devastate a community, resulting in the decline of the neighborhood through increased insurance premiums, loss of business revenue, and a decrease in property values.

The fire service can help communities reduce the occurrence of arson and reduce its devastating effect by making residents aware of the following measures to safeguard their church, mosque, synagogue, temple or chapel.
Background

The United States has approximately 345,000 religious congregations consisting of about 150 million members. These members comprise more than 230 different denominational groups. Christian (e.g., Protestant, Catholic, Orthodox Christian, and Latter-day Saints) assemblies account for nearly 97 percent of U.S. congregations. The average congregation has a median attendance of 60 people at its main worship service. Religious facilities often host regular worship services, and some facilities include schools, daycare centers, administrative offices, residences, and other resources for members of the community. Some houses of worship, such as the Washington National Cathedral, are national icons.

Potential threats to houses of worship can originate from disaffected individuals (e.g., employees or outsiders) and from domestic and international terrorist groups. According to U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) statistics, the approximately 17 percent of all hate crimes recorded in 2013 were directed at individuals because of a bias against a religious belief. The DOJ statistics further indicate that nearly three-fourths of hate crimes motivated by religious bias targeted non-Christian victims: most were directed against Jews. Racial bias, the most prominent motivator of hate crime, also may incite threats against houses of worship as the majority of congregations in the United States involve members who are of the same race.

Potential Threats

Adversaries have a wide variety of weapons and tactics available to achieve their objectives and have demonstrated the ability to plan and conduct complex attacks against multiple targets. Attacks on houses of worship can involve a variety of different methods, including active shooters; improvised explosive devices (IEDs); vehicle-borne IEDs (VBIEDs); and/or arson. As the following examples demonstrate, deliberate attacks on houses of worship are a real threat that can inflict considerable harm.

- In June 2015, a man attended a Bible study at Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston, South Carolina, for approximately 1 hour before shooting and killing nine people.
- In February 2015, a man allegedly burned down one of three buildings at the Quba Islamic Institute in Houston.

4 Ibid
• In October 2012, a gunman entered the World Changers Church International in suburban Atlanta and shot and killed a volunteer who was leading a prayer group.\(^8\)
• In August 2012, a gunman shot and killed six people and wounded three others at a Sikh Temple in Oak Creek, Wisconsin. The gunman then shot and critically wounded a responding police officer before shooting and killing himself.\(^9\)

Individuals, small teams of a few perpetrators, or larger groups acting in a coordinated fashion can carry out attacks. The threats of greatest concern to houses of worship include:

**Active Shooter and Small Arms Attack** - Adversaries can launch these attacks using conventional firearms, automatic weapons, or similar weapons to harm people indiscriminately or take hostages.

**Improvised Explosive Device** - An IED or “homemade bomb” can be constructed of commonly available materials, construction explosives (e.g., dynamite), or stolen military-grade explosives. Attackers can carry an IED into a facility via an individual (e.g., a suicide bomber) or can deposit it in an unnoticed location for detonation at a later time using a timer or remote control.

**Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device** – Houses of worship are also vulnerable to VBIED attacks—IEDs loaded into a vehicle (car, truck, or motorcycle). Adversaries can park the vehicle close to a facility and near areas where large numbers of people gather, or they can crash the vehicle through barriers and detonate the explosives. VBIEDs are much larger and more dangerous than IEDs carried by an individual.

**Arson** - Arsonists can set intentional fires by igniting highly flammable materials (e.g., gasoline) at a house of worship facility. Accelerants that promote the spread and intensity of a fire can be applied beforehand and then ignited.

**Sabotage, Vandalism, and Theft** - Sabotage, vandalism, and theft of religious artifacts are also concerns for houses of worship. Sabotage of equipment, such as of the heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning (HVAC) system, could disrupt religious ceremonies and other activities that take place at a religious facility. Acts of vandalism, such as those involving the defacement or destruction of religious symbols, and the theft of religious artifacts, may have psychological and emotional effects on congregations. In addition, they may incur costly repairs for organizations with limited resources.

**Chemical, Biological, or Radiological Attack** - Attackers can use chemicals as weapons, including toxic industrial chemicals (e.g., ammonia, hydrogen fluoride, and chlorine) and chemical warfare agents (e.g., sarin, VX). They can bring these substances near or into a religious facility and disperse them using explosives. Although chemical warfare agents are not readily available, terrorists have procured and used them previously. Adversaries can introduce biological pathogens (e.g., anthrax, plague) into a facility through its HVAC system or spread

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them through direct contact (e.g., through contaminated letters delivered by mail). They can use radiological dispersal devices such as “dirty bombs” which use a conventional explosion to scatter radioactive materials. Radioactive materials are widely used in laboratories, medical centers, food irradiation plants, and industrial facilities; adversaries may steal or otherwise acquire these materials from these locations.

Natural Hazards/Accidents

Natural hazards—including infectious diseases and illnesses, fire, and seismic and weather-related events (e.g., hurricanes, tornadoes, flash floods)—can also adversely impact houses of worship. Such hazards can affect the safety of employees and members, as well as the facility’s ability to carry out normal operations.

- In April 2014, an EF-3 tornado, part of a storm system impacting 10 States, leveled Grace Falls Church in Fayetteville, Tennessee, and destroyed the pastor’s home next to the church building.¹⁰
- In October 2012, Superstorm Sandy damaged or destroyed dozens of places of worship, including St. Elizabeth’s Chapel-by-the-Sea in Ortley Beach, New Jersey, which was completely washed away.¹¹

Potential Indicators of an Attack¹²

Attack indicators are observable anomalies or incidents that may precede an attack or be associated with surveillance, training, planning, preparation, or mobilization activities. Potential indicators typically fall into the following categories: imminent attack indicators and surveillance indicators.

**Imminent Attack Indicators** - These indicators may show that an attack is imminent and that immediate action is required. Indicators of an imminent attack include people, vehicles, or packages that demonstrate unusual or suspicious behavior that requires an immediate response.

**Surveillance Indicators** - Surveillance indicators may provide evidence that religious facilities are under surveillance by individuals planning an attack. One indicator of potential surveillance includes persons in the vicinity of houses of worship intending to gather information about the facility or its operations and protective measures.

Potential indicators of an imminent attack, or that a facility may be under surveillance, are listed in Table 1.

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¹² Indicators identified in this section draw from information found in U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (2007) and New Jersey Office of Homeland Security & Preparedness (NJOSHSP) (undated), as well as information gathered during visits to critical infrastructure sites as part of the Enhanced Critical Infrastructure Program.
Table 1: Potential Indicators of an Attack

**Imminent Attack Indicators**

- Suspicious persons in crowded areas wearing unusually bulky clothing that might conceal explosives or weapons.
- Unexpected or unfamiliar delivery trucks arriving at the facility.
- Unattended packages (e.g., backpacks, briefcases, boxes) or suspicious packages and/or letters received by mail.
- Recent damage (e.g., significant holes or cuts) to a perimeter fence or gate, perimeter lighting, or other security devices.

**Surveillance Indicators – Suspicious Persons**

- Persons using or carrying video/camera/observation equipment or night vision devices in or near the facility over an extended period.
- Persons parking, standing, or loitering in the same area over a multiple-day period with no apparent reasonable explanation.
- Persons inquiring excessively about practices pertaining to the facility and its operations or the facility’s supporting infrastructure (e.g., telecommunications, electricity, natural gas, water).
- Persons observed or reported to be observing facility receipts or deliveries.
- Employees observed or reported to be willfully associating with suspicious individuals, changing working behavior, or working more irregular hours.

**Surveillance Indicators – Suspicious Activities Observed or Reported**

- An increase in buildings left unsecured or doors left unlocked, when they are normally secured and locked at all times.
- A noted pattern of false alarms requiring a response by law enforcement or emergency services.
- Theft of employee or contractor identification (ID) cards, uniforms, or guard force communications equipment or unauthorized persons in possession of facility ID cards, uniforms, or equipment.
- Unfamiliar contract workers attempting to access unauthorized areas.
- Unusual and unexpected maintenance activities (e.g., road repairs) near the facility.
- Sudden increases in power outages designed to test the backup systems or recovery times.

Houses of worship should establish communication channels with local law enforcement to maintain awareness of potentially threatening situations in the area.

**Common Vulnerabilities**

A variety of factors—such as the sheer number of houses of worship in the United States, the scheduling and predictability of times when members gather to worship (which facilitate surveillance and targeting), and the attractiveness of houses of worship as “soft targets”—contribute to challenges facing facilities in terms of protection and security. Violent attacks at houses of worship have highlighted vulnerabilities and have offered valuable lessons for protecting the facilities, the people who attend them, and the employees who work in them. In addition, houses of worship often become disaster relief centers following natural disasters and other mass-casualty events. Effective planning and preparedness training for such incidents enables houses of worship personnel to identify their potential roles in relief efforts.

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This section identifies key common vulnerabilities associated with houses of worship and security and resilience measures that facility personnel can adopt to address those vulnerabilities. Although these potential vulnerabilities do not all apply to all houses of worship, they have been identified as priority focus areas for management and security personnel to review. This section is informed by data collected by U.S. Department of Homeland Security Protective Security Advisors since 2009 on vulnerabilities and security resilience measures at houses of worship across the United States, who voluntarily participated in security surveys.

1. Open Access

- **Unrestricted access to religious services.** In general, houses of worship are open to all, at least during religious services. Depending on the type of structure, the nature of access restrictions and other security measures that may be in place, houses of worship may or may not be able to control a potential adversary’s access to the facility.

- **Unrestricted access to peripheral areas.** Houses of worship are vulnerable to attacks outside their main building, such as in contiguous parking areas, where vehicles have unrestricted access and are generally not inspected, and in auxiliary buildings such as educational facilities. At all but one of the facilities surveyed, uncontrolled parking areas permit vehicles to park within 400 feet of the facility.

- **Proximity of houses of worship and neighboring facilities, especially in urban areas.** Many facilities are located in urban areas in close proximity to homes and small businesses. This proximity can make maintaining effective perimeter security more difficult, cost-prohibitive, and counter to the facility’s overall goals of community engagement.

- **Limited or no vehicle access controls.** The layouts of most facilities permit close proximity of vehicles to buildings and areas where people congregate. These features include parking areas, driveways on facility grounds, and nearby streets. Usually no vehicle barriers exist near the main entrances or other vulnerable parts of the buildings. About two-thirds of facilities surveyed have a high-speed avenue of approach; most do not use barriers to mitigate this vulnerability or to enforce standoff distance from the facility.

- **Lack of control of vendor and contractor personnel.** Individuals who deliver parcels or are hired to perform construction or repair work often receive unescorted access without inspection of the packages they deliver or materials they bring into the facility.

- **Unprotected utilities.** Houses of worship generally leave HVAC units and other critical building utility supply components (e.g., water, electric power, and natural gas service) easily accessible.
2. **Gathering of People of a Particular Faith** - A house of worship attracts a group of people of like faith at a single location at specified times. This gathering makes the facility a ready target for an adversary seeking to attack that particular group of people. Easy identification of the specific faith, either by facility configuration or signage, increases this vulnerability. Some facilities have a larger average weekly attendance of 2,000 or more. The largest of these “megachurches” in the United States are typically Protestant and have between 15,000 and 45,000 members.\(^1^4\) Megachurches may have security personnel, usually volunteers or off-duty police officers, to direct traffic and provide security for the large numbers of people gathered onsite.

3. **Limited Security Budget** - Many houses of worship have small budgets that the facility uses primarily to pay for basic operations and to provide services to the congregation and surrounding communities. Many do not have the financial resources to implement security measures. As a result, these facilities may not employ a security manager or have a written security plan.

**Protective Measures**

Security and resilience measures include equipment, personnel, and procedures designed to protect a facility against threats and hazards and to mitigate the effects of an adverse event. Some measures are permanent features that provide routine protection for a facility. Others are implemented or intensified only during times of heightened alert.

The relatively open access to religious facilities’ building(s) and grounds makes it difficult to secure them. Security measures should be comprehensive, integrating equipment, personnel, procedures, and information sharing to ensure involvement of all employees and volunteers. Including all employees in security operations at facilities, and training them in observation skills, increases the number of eyes “on the floor” and improves the chances of detecting a threat.

Based on security survey data, houses of worship typically have a relatively low security and resilience posture. Actions that houses of worship have taken to address vulnerabilities center primarily in the areas of security management, recovery mechanisms, and physical security. The most widely adopted security management protective measures include sensitive information management, suspicious-package procedures, and security information communication. With recovery mechanisms, houses of worship have focused attention on reducing the time necessary for the facility to recover full operations after losing significant components and critical resources. For physical security, activities have centered on measures related to illumination, building envelope, and parking.

The table below identifies security and resilience measures that may be appropriate for houses of worship. Some protective measures identified below may not be feasible for individual facilities (particularly smaller facilities with limited budgets and staff) due to resource constraints. In addition, facilities may perceive select measures identified in this table as conflicting with their commitment to open access. However, these protective measures provide a starting point for discussion among stakeholders at houses of worship—including leadership, security and emergency response personnel, and congregants—on decisions and tradeoffs involved in safeguarding their facilities from natural and manmade hazards.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Protective Measures</th>
<th>Vulnerable Operating Conditions</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>EQUIPMENT</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Facility perimeter</strong>. Define the facility perimeter and areas within the facility that require access control.</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Perimeter barriers.</strong> Evaluate the need for perimeter barriers (e.g., fences, berms, concrete walls) around the facility to demarcate the boundary of the site to protect against trespassing; to provide access control by channeling individuals through authorized access points; and/or to protect against unauthorized entry by providing increased access delay and more time for assessment.</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mitigate high-speed avenues of approach.</strong> Evaluate vehicle traffic patterns near the facility. Design and implement strategies to reduce vehicle speeds, improve pedestrian safety, and reduce the threat of vehicle approach velocities.</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Enforce standoff.</strong> Install barriers to increase standoff distance and reduce damage from a potential explosive device. Options include, but are not limited to, fixed and retractable bollards, engineered planters, heavy objects, trees, walls, landscape barriers, water obstacles, and Jersey barriers.</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Environmental design.</strong> Employ Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design principles, concepts, and strategies (e.g., water barriers, landscaping, high curbs, shallow ditches) to provide enhanced penetration delay. Consult Appendix A of Site and Urban Design for Security: Guidance against Potential Terrorist Attacks (FEMA 430) and Tables 2.4 and 2.5 of Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings (FEMA 426/BIPS 06) for more information.</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Closed-circuit television (CCTV).</strong> Explore the feasibility of installing a comprehensive CCTV system onsite. Evaluate the need for real-time monitoring of the CCTV system based on the security requirements of the facility.</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Illumination maintenance program.</strong> Establish a maintenance protocol to ensure that illumination system components are regularly inspected and repaired or replaced as necessary. Ensure that lighting fixtures are clean and properly aimed.</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Secure utility equipment.</strong> Secure components of critical utility systems inside and outside the facility against unauthorized access.</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Access restrictions.</strong> Provide adequate door and window locks, barred entryways, and fencing and gate locks to areas where access is to be limited; add intrusion detection systems and alarms as appropriate.</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Doors and windows.</strong> Install secure locks on all external and internal doors and windows with quick-release capability from within for emergency escape.</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Backup power.</strong> Evaluate power requirements for the facility to maintain core operations, and install backup power equipment accordingly. At a minimum, ensure all life-safety services have backup power.</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protective Measures</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Communication.</strong> Install system(s) that provide for communication with all individuals at the facility, including employees, congregation members, visitors, and emergency response teams.</td>
<td>Open Access</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Emergency response equipment.</strong> Ensure the facility necessary equipment to respond to a crisis. For example, ensure that emergency communications equipment is present and operable. Provide a secondary means of communications as a backup. Consider whether master keys are readily available to provide to first responders so that they have complete access to the facility in an emergency. Maintain a cache of first aid supplies and disperse them throughout the facility.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>PERSONNEL</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Security manager.</strong> Designate a security manager and task that person with developing, implementing, and coordinating all security-related activities.</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Emergency manager.</strong> Designate an emergency manager to develop, implement, and coordinate all emergency management-related activities.</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Background checks.</strong> Explore feasibility of conducting comprehensive background checks on facility personnel.</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Security awareness training.</strong> Incorporate security awareness and appropriate response procedures for security situations into employee and volunteer training programs.</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>If You See Something, Say Something™.</strong> Raise awareness among the congregation of potential threats and vulnerabilities. Encourage facility personnel and members of the congregation to report anything that appears to be odd or suspicious.</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Emergency response training.</strong> Incorporate emergency response into employee and volunteer training programs. Ensure personnel are aware of their roles and responsibilities during a crisis.</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>PROCEDURES</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Monitoring and surveillance program.</strong> Evaluate the facility’s security requirements and design a monitoring, surveillance, and inspection program that is consistent with facility operations and security requirements. Provide visual surveillance, and train system monitors to detect suspicious behavior.</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Security planning.</strong> Review, update, and validate the security plan regularly. Develop a comprehensive security plan specific to the facility if one does not already exist. The plan should address issues such as the following: protection of building occupants; protection of sensitive information; protection of funds; facility access control procedures; suspicious activity reporting procedures; employee termination procedures; parking security; background checks; prohibited items; security force; end-of-day security checks; control and accountability of equipment (including keys); electronic security systems (including CCTV); physical security inspection programs; and security awareness training programs. Train personnel on the plan, and exercise the plan at least once a year.</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td>Protective Measures</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Threat levels.</strong> Incorporate a threat level system into the security plan.</td>
<td>Open Access</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Security information reporting.</strong> Develop a plan and procedures for reporting threats, threatening behavior, and concerning behavior that occur or are observed at the facility, and make the congregation aware of the plan.</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Access by members and visitors.</strong> Consider limiting access by congregation members and visitors to select areas in the facility (e.g., offices, storage areas, utility rooms).</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Accountability for children.</strong> Establish an accountability system for children attending classes, events, etc., such as a secure child check-in/check-out system.</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Vehicle restrictions.</strong> Explore the feasibility of prohibiting parking near critical utility equipment.</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Illegally parked vehicles.</strong> Require that all illegally parked vehicles be moved or have them towed.</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Suspicious packages.</strong> Train personnel responsible for receiving deliveries to recognize suspicious mail, packages, and shipments.</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Trash containers.</strong> Secure dumpsters and other trash containers to prevent the hiding of explosives or other hazardous materials.</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Emergency response planning.</strong> Review, update, and validate the emergency plan regularly. Develop a comprehensive emergency plan specific to the facility if one does not already exist. Train personnel on the plan, and exercise the plan at least once a year. Refer to the Guide for Developing High-Quality Emergency Operations Plans for Houses of Worship released by the White House in 2013 for more information. A recorded webinar that includes presentations on the Guide, a brief question and answer session, and information on how to access more information and resources is available through the Readiness and Emergency Management for Schools Technical Assistance Center Website and on YouTube. Train personnel on the plan, and exercise the plan at least once a year.</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Evacuation, lockdown, and shelter-in-place.</strong> Review plans and procedures for evacuation, lockdown, and shelter-in-place.</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Consideration of access and functional needs.</strong> Ensure emergency plans provide for the needs of people with disabilities and other access and functional needs, particularly when considering evacuation procedures and staging areas.</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Safe areas.</strong> Establish safe areas within the facility for assembly and refuge during crises.</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Status of equipment.</strong> Check the status of emergency response equipment and supplies on a regular basis.</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Emergency shutdown.</strong> Ensure that the appropriate personnel are familiar with procedures for shutting off utility services (e.g., electricity, natural gas) in emergency situations.</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Emergency communications.</strong> Establish and implement an emergency communications system such as phone trees or mass text messaging.</td>
<td>✓</td>
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</table>
### Table 2: Potential Baseline Protective Measures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Protective Measures</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Incident management.</strong> Establish an incident management and command center dedicated to facilitating the coordination and support of emergency management activities.</td>
<td>![Checkmark] ![Checkmark] ![Checkmark] ![Checkmark]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### INFORMATION SHARING

**First responder interaction.** Establish liaison and regular communication with local law enforcement, fire response agencies, and emergency medical services. Coordinate security and emergency plans with first responders to enhance incident response. Conduct onsite visits with first responders to increase their familiarity with the facility. | ![Checkmark] ![Checkmark] ![Checkmark] ![Checkmark] |

**Security and emergency preparedness working groups.** Join relevant security and emergency preparedness working groups. Establish liaisons and regular communications with Federal, State, and local-level groups, as well as private sector/industry groups, to share expertise and prepare to better respond to security incidents and emergencies. | ![Checkmark] ![Checkmark] ![Checkmark] ![Checkmark] |

**State and local emergency operation centers (EOCs).** Collaborate with a State and/or local EOC to facilitate the exchange of real-time situational awareness information. | ![Checkmark] ![Checkmark] ![Checkmark] ![Checkmark] |

**Fusion centers.** Join a State or local fusion center to share intelligence about potential threats or to alert facility about an imminent attack. | ![Checkmark] ![Checkmark] ![Checkmark] ![Checkmark] |

#### CYBERSECURITY

**Security plan for computer and information systems.** Develop and implement a security plan for computer and information systems hardware and software, including a recovery and restoration plan to return computer systems to full functionality after an incident. | ![Checkmark] ![Checkmark] |

**Protect sensitive information.** Require employees to use a specific login and unique password to access their electronic files. | ![Checkmark] ![Checkmark] ![Checkmark] |

**Information control.** Eliminate information from facility Website that might aid potential adversaries in planning an attack. | ![Checkmark] ![Checkmark] ![Checkmark] |
विश्व पूर्वविकिना वीडी नटेज
सदेह जंगलवारी उग्र होते आहे-सुभाषे म्हणून ते रे।

1. भूमि
   - संध्या विषयक वर्तमान छायाचित्र करा येईल कसा फिल्माने चाहें
   - आपल्यांनी सिंगल विषयक फिल्म विहारी
   - आपल्यांनी ह्या विषयक फिल्माने विहारे

2. लहान
   - जंगलवरीच्या दिनांनी फिल्माने विहारे तांदुळांनी मृदुचित\लहान बुझवती
   - बांधव सारख्या फिल्माने विहारे तांदुळांनी मृदुचित\लहान बुझवती

3. भांत
   - खेळाडूसल्या म्हणून कृपया ह्या प्रतिकृत मुद्द्यांना स्वीकार करा ज्यांचे बुधवारी फिल्माने विहारे
   - जंगलवारी ने जमूक्ष फिल्माने विहारे
   - मृदुला जमूक्ष ने जमूक्ष फिल्माने विहारे

मंदिर विश्वविकिना प्रेमांना विषयक वर्तमान वेगवेगळ्या ने मदत देतो. सेवेद इवडून सेवेद वेळ साठी बद्दल विषयक मंदिर उठवाव आहे. मंदिर उला ए मंदिर कार्यक्रम करताना बद्दल निर्देशांवर ३ संध्यांत वेळ भेट देतात:
   - मतां माझी-माझीरी साधारण दिनांच्या वेळेत राहू
   - जंगलवारी वर्तमान इंती तोड-काशाच्या, अते सामाजिक-शिक्षण वित्त विविध संगठनांच्या वेळी राहू
   - जंगलवरी वर्तमान इंती गोड वालभोग आहे
   - तिथी, जंगलवारी वर्तमान इंती गोड वाळावर असे समस्या सुलभ करू शकता
   - जंगलवारी ने जमूक्ष वाळावर मंदिर आहे, शिक्षण बडाच्या वेळी जाणून घ्यावा

उग्र होते जंगलवारी मंदिर विषयक वर्तमान जमूक्ष ने गोडहात्म्यांना बद्दल जाणून घ्यावा तेंदूळी विषयक वेळ राहू.
HOW TO RESPOND
WHEN AN ACTIVE SHOOTER IS IN YOUR VICINITY

QUICKLY DETERMINE THE MOST REASONABLE WAY TO PROTECT YOUR OWN LIFE. CUSTOMERS AND CLIENTS ARE LIKELY TO FOLLOW THE LEAD OF EMPLOYEES AND MANAGERS DURING AN ACTIVE SHOOTER SITUATION.

1. Run
   • Have an escape route and plan in mind
   • Leave your belongings behind
   • Keep your hands visible

2. Hide
   • Hide in an area out of the active shooter’s view.
   • Block entry to your hiding place and lock the doors

3. Fight
   • As a last resort and only when your life is in imminent danger.
   • Attempt to incapacitate the active shooter
   • Act with physical aggression and throw items at the active shooter

CALL 911 WHEN IT IS SAFE TO DO SO

HOW TO RESPOND
WHEN LAW ENFORCEMENT ARRIVES ON THE SCENE

1. HOW YOU SHOULD REACT WHEN LAW ENFORCEMENT ARRIVES:
   • Remain calm, and follow officers’ instructions
   • Immediately raise hands and spread fingers
   • Keep hands visible at all times
   • Avoid making quick movements toward officers such as attempting to hold on to them for safety
   • Avoid pointing, screaming and/or yelling
   • Do not stop to ask officers for help or direction when evacuating, just proceed in the direction from which officers are entering the premises

2. INFORMATION YOU SHOULD PROVIDE TO LAW ENFORCEMENT OR 911 OPERATOR:
   • Location of the victims and the active shooter
   • Number of shooters, if more than one
   • Physical description of shooter/s
   • Number and type of weapons held by the shooter/s
   • Number of potential victims at the location

RECOGNIZING SIGNS
OF POTENTIAL WORKPLACE VIOLENCE

AN ACTIVE SHOOTER MAY BE A CURRENT OR FORMER EMPLOYEE. ALERT YOUR HUMAN RESOURCES DEPARTMENT IF YOU BELIEVE AN EMPLOYEE EXHIBITS POTENTIALLY VIOLENT BEHAVIOR. INDICATORS OF POTENTIALLY VIOLENT BEHAVIOR MAY INCLUDE ONE OR MORE OF THE FOLLOWING:

• Increased use of alcohol and/or illegal drugs
• Unexplained increase in absenteeism, and/or vague physical complaints
• Depression/Withdrawal
• Increased severe mood swings, and noticeably unstable or emotional responses
• Increasingly talks of problems at home
• Increase in unsolicited comments about violence, firearms, and other dangerous weapons and violent crimes

Contact your building management or human resources department for more information and training on active shooter response in your workplace.